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Refugees crossing the sea.
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million people to be displaced every year.
Other organizations describe the likelihood that many millions of people
will leave their homes and livelihoods
because of climate change-related events,
including the World Bank,3 the World
Health Organization,4 the Norwegian
Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre,5 the UN,6 the
Brookings Institute,7 and recently the
White House.8 Facilitating such prediction, the science of extreme event attribution continues to develop and raise
alarms. This rapidly developing field
brings increasingly sophisticated and
reliable efforts to bear to answer the
question, “Has climate change influenced
the frequency, likelihood, and/or severity
of individual extreme events?” What
were until recently unanswerable hypotheticals are now approachable scientific
questions.9 Climate modeling now anticipates sea-level rise on the scale of several
meters over a 50- to 150-year time scale,
with impacts in coastal areas at least that
will be transformational.10 Elevation data
indicate that 230 million people live
within 1 m elevation from current sea
level.11
As discussions of the fate of people
impacted by climate change have
unfolded, other voices have emerged to
interrogate what they view as “the predominant normative politicization of the

climate (change)-migration narrative,”12
challenging sometimes simplistic explanations by which human movements are
explained. A full analysis of the appropriate way to understand large-scale
human movements has begun elsewhere
in the literature, including discussions of
the rhetorical use of “refugees” in the
securitization of climate change, the relationship between development narratives
surrounding threats of refugees and
donor self-interest, long-standing pre
existing factors related to human migration, concerns about the relationship
between sustainable development and
neoliberal economic policies, and other
factors beyond the scope of this article.13
Securitization deserves special note as a
deeply political question; international
tensions are high over migrants coming
from politically unstable nations both
impacted recently by severe drought and
associated by many today with potential
terrorist risks (e.g., Sudan, Iraq, and
Iran). It is also notable that many authors
question whether categorizing climate
change alone as the cause of much migration characterized as “climate migration”
is appropriate, as many other factors are
in play in decisions to migrate.14,15,16 A
more nuanced research agenda for the
future would take into account uncertainties in estimates of climate changerelated movement, and would analyze
Oxfam East Africa, Wikimedia commons (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)

T

wo widely recognized
attempts at comprehensive
descriptions of human rights
of refugees exist, and they
have produced influential
sets of criteria that could be used in
determining whether someone who
requests refugee status will have it granted.
Both of these sources recently released
statements commenting on the possible
status of climate refugees, responding to
migrants attempting to gain refugee status
due to factors they attribute to the
increasing impacts of climate change (the
September 2020 General Distribution of
its Views Adopted by the Committee
under Article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, Concerning Communication
No. 2728/2016 by the UN Human Rights
Committee; and the March 2021 Pastoral
Guidelines on Climate Displaced People
from the Vatican’s Dicastery for Promoting
Integral Human Development). These
documents highlight two different
approaches it is possible to take toward
environmentally related refugee status
petitions, and the impacts these discrepant
approaches will have for real people
seeking refugee status as this crisis plays
out. The case study of Ioane Teitiota and
his family, from Kiribati, and of their
unsuccessful attempt to claim status as
climate change refugees is presented and
analyzed.
This article focuses on the fates of
those who attempt to claim refugee status
due to events they ascribe to climate
change. The ways that discussions of
people who leave their homes en masse
are framed are complicated. The United
Nations’ (UN’s) relevant legally protected
category for those leaving their homes
has been “Refugee” since 1951.1 As a
unique legal protection has been tied to
the “Refugee” category, we focus on the
result of people’s appeals that they attain
this category.
The fate of people fleeing the impacts
of climate change has been identified by
many organizations as a forthcoming
humanitarian crisis. The World
Meteorological organization estimated2
that from 2010 to 2019 weather events
exacerbated or increased in frequency by
climate change caused on average 23.1

Family gathering sticks and branches to use as firewood.
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John Englart (Takver). Wikimedia commons
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/)

No. 2728/2016 by the UN Human
Rights Committee; and the March
2021 Pastoral Guidelines on Climate
Displaced People from the Vatican’s
Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human
Development). These documents highlight two different approaches it is possible to take toward climate refugees, and
the impacts these discrepant approaches
will have as this crisis plays out. As shown
in the following, the Vatican’s Dicastery
for Promoting Integral Human
Development’s Pastoral Guidelines on
Climate Displaced People provides a
pathway for the protection of climate refugees to which the UN and other major
organizations could turn.

The Melbourne Walk Against Warming during COP15, 2009.

“The Term ‘Climate Refugee’
“multiple forms, directions, and multi- transpired in the intervening decade- Is Not Endorsed by UNHCR”:
plicities of human movement in the con- plus. Conca (January/February 2019) The UN on Environmental
text of climate change,” preferably to examined a potential role for the UN Refugees

be articulated as “climate mobilities.”17
However, this article focuses on the people, moved by the complicated forces just
summarized, who are striving to receive
the legal protections afforded to refugees
and who characterize their movement as
being primarily motivated by climate
change for these purposes. While they
might be more accurately described in
other categories if other legal protections
were available, it is nonetheless important to analyze these requests under the
existing refugee framework, along with
how the existing framework might meet
these needs more appropriately.
Worries about the legal and moral
status of people displaced by environmental change have featured on these
pages for decades. Pittock (December
2002) noted that “Migrants displaced by
environmental and economic stresses are
not legally refugees and thus may not be
welcome in many countries.” Bierman
and Boas (November/December 2008)
called for a global protocol for climate
change refugees18 and discussed reasons
that the United Nations Development
Programme and the World Bank
might be better equipped than the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees to meet the needs of the anticipated numbers, but none of that has
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Security Council and described reasons
why, except for brief moments in the
Council, it has been generally unwilling
to debate climate change threats in a formal way. Recently, the additional thread
of the social injustices faced by migrant
women has been discussed by Santos
(September/October 2021).
The preceding all helps to set the context for this article, which is focused specifically on human rights and what the
UN already owes (or should owe) to persons claiming (or attempting to claim)
refugee status under the existing rules.
The relationship of human health considerations to potential refugee status
due to climate change is explored in the
following. In considering persons who
make claims to being climate change refugees, we examine how those claims are
received and the implications for the
people involved of that treatment.
Two widely recognized attempts at
comprehensive descriptions of human
rights of refugees exist. Both these sources
recently released statements commenting
on people who would identify with
and claim climate refugee status (the
September 2020 General Distribution of
its Views Adopted by the Committee
under Article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, Concerning Communication

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

The UN rights tradition, which began
with the UN’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948)19 and was subsequently elaborated upon by other documents such as the Convention and
protocol relating to the status of refugees
(1951),20 has until very recently failed
to address climate change refugees.
The term “climate refugee,” frequently
encountered in newspaper, periodical,
scholarly article, or book, has had no
meaning according to the UN, which
otherwise provides protection to “refugees” propelled to leave their homes by
many other forces. Persons who leave
their homes due to climate change and
seek asylum elsewhere fall into a deep
crack in the UN’s designations. This is in
part because the UN defines refugees as
people who have crossed an international border
[O]wing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is out-side the
country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.21
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Bwag. Wikimedia commons
(https:// creativecommons.org /licenses /by-sa /4.0/)

Refugees wait at the West Railway Station in Vienna, Austria, in 2015.

The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, on its webpage Climate
change and disaster displacement 22 that
begins “climate change is the defining crisis
of our time and disaster displacement one
of its most devastating consequences,”
nonetheless concludes the same document with:
[T]here may be situations where
the refugee criteria of the 1951
Convention or the broader refugee criteria of regional refugee law
frameworks could apply. People
may have a valid claim for refugee status, for example, where the
adverse effects of climate change
interact with armed conflict and
violence... Regardless, the term “climate refugee” is not endorsed by
UNHCR, and it is more accurate
to refer to “persons displaced in
the context of disasters and climate
change.”

10
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According to this conclusion, climate
change alone can’t make you a refugee;
it can only act as an enhancing factor to
something like a war. In this definition,
to be refugees, people must be subject
to forces put in place by an intentional
actor that caused them to move. This
cannot be fleeing mere environmental
hazards: Environmental disasters do not
act intentionally, and even more importantly, other environmental health
threats cannot be included in this
framework at all.
There are two primary reasons that
climate change (even when it indirectly
affects someone’s health or life) is not the
sort of thing that can propel migration
that fits under the UN’s definition of refugees: (1) the lack of an intentional actor
and (2) its indiscriminate nature. In allegations of human rights violations, the
states (or governments) are the accused
parties, and international law has yet to
treat states as the perpetrator causing the

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

land to be uninhabitable due to climate
conditions. While indirectly one could
argue that the state is at fault through its
failure to protect the rights of its citizens,
the bar for proving this is too high to be
met in climate-related claims of refugee
status. To substantiate the claim that the
state has exhausted all measures and
failed to protect human rights against
environmental impacts is extremely difficult. The individual would have to
prove that her reason for fleeing is a
result of a state failure.
This leads to the second problem. In
order to count as refugees under the
UN’s definition, climate refugees would
have to flee as a result of a rights violation that is arbitrary and discriminative.
That is, while the impacts of climate
change may be felt by the most vulnerable in society, it is hard to establish that
the impacts of climate change are selective to the individual or their recognizable group.
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A protection gap often exists for
CDP both when they are displaced
within national borders and across
international borders. However, no
matter their legal status, all States
are obligated to protect their fundamental human rights.
The POCDP defines the causes and
scope of the humanitarian crisis due to
climate change:

Melbourne Global climate strike, 2019.

“Can We Disregard the
Growing Phenomenon of
‘Environmental Refugees’?”:
The Catholic Church on
Environmental Refugees
The Catholic Church’s response to
climate refugees, part of the aforementioned second attempt at a comprehensive statement on human rights, began in
some ways with predecessor statements
in 189123 and 1931.24 For the present
abbreviated discussion, Pacem in Terris
by Pope John XXIII in 1963 can suffice
as the origin of this modern Catholic
rights tradition25 in the Vatican II era,
when it declared:
These rights and duties are universal
and inviolable … the right to bodily
integrity and to the means necessary
for the proper development of life,
particularly food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, rest, and, finally, the
necessary social services … the right
to be looked after in the event of ill
health; disability … or whenever
through no fault … deprived of the
means of livelihood.
This initial list of human rights explicitly includes reference to individual
health and what is needed to maintain
individual health. It is this suggestion

MAY/JUNE 2022

that someone could be a refugee if they
choose to leave their home because of
threats to their health that could allow
climate refugees protection. Climate
change impacts, whether changing rainfall patterns that impact agriculture, heat
waves that jeopardize the physically fragile, or ocean acidification that damages
fisheries, would all be counted as violations of these human rights. Additional
documents from Catholic social teaching
on climate change and human rights are
too numerous to discuss here but have
been elaborated upon elsewhere.26
This thought has come to fruition now
in the 2021 publication by the Vatican
Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human
Development’s Pastoral Orientations on
Climate Displaced People (hereafter the
POCDP).27 The Preface speaks of people:

The climate crisis can lead to displacement when homes become
uninhabitable or livelihoods are
lost. Displacement can take place
either due to rapid-onset triggers,
mainly extreme weather phenomena like floods, storms, droughts
and wildfires; or slow-onset processes, like desertification, depletion of natural resources, water
scarcity, rising temperatures, and
sea-level rise.
This highlights the possibility that
land can become “uninhabitable,” and
includes as examples phenomena that
make lands uninhabitable because they
are hazardous to their inhabitants. A simple inability to inhabit a land is enough
for those choosing to leave it to fall into
the category of refugees, therefore
deserving refugee protections. This can
be clearly justified by a concern for the
human right to health, and this broad
definition seems poised to cover all of the
threats prospective climate refugees face.

Forced to abandon fields and shorelines, homes and villages, people
flee in haste carrying just a few
souvenirs and treasures, scraps of
their culture and heritage.

The example of Ioane Teitiota,
Kiribati, the New Zealand
Immigration and Protection
Tribunal, and the UN
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Human Rights Committee

The POCDP, in a section entitled
Responding
to
Climate-Induced
Displacement, defines the problem for
climate displaced persons (CDP), and
calls for protection of their basic human
rights, critiquing the terminology of the
1951 Refugee Convention:

The first step taken by the UN to
acknowledge that people leaving their
homes for reasons connected to climate
change deserve the legal protections of
refugees, the broadening of its consideration of refugees to allow for the possibility that the land people are living on

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV
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Erin Magee/DFAT. Wikimedia commons (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)

Kiribati is at risk from sea level rise caused by climate change.

itself might disappear and that this would
force them to become refugees, occurred
in September, 2020. The UN International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Human Rights Committee distributed its
ruling on an attempt by Ioane Teitiota to
claim refugee status in New Zealand for
himself and his family. Teitiota is from
Kiribati, an island threatened by rising
seas and saltwater intrusion encroaching
on farmland and drinking water supplies.28 Teitiota’s claim was unsuccessful
on the grounds that complete catastrophe
by inundation might be 10 or 15 years
away and there was still time for something to intervene.29 The New Zealand
Immigration and Protection Tribunal
language, cited in the Human Rights
Committee ruling, clearly referenced the
UN Refugee Convention when it said:
“[W]hile in many cases the effects
of environmental change and natural disasters will not bring affected
persons within the scope of the

12
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Refugee Convention, no hard and
fast rules or presumptions of nonapplicability exist. Care must be
taken to examine the particular
features of the case.” After further
examination, the Tribunal concluded that the author did not
objectively face a real risk of being
persecuted if returned to Kiribati.30
However, the Human Rights Committee
also said31 that climate change refugees
could exist in other circumstances, saying:
The effects of climate change in
receiving States may expose individuals to a violation of their rights
[allowing them to claim refugee status] … Furthermore, given that the
risk of an entire country becoming
submerged under water is such an
extreme risk, the conditions of life in
such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is realized.

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

This expansion of the definition of a refugee allows for a new possibility: that the
land a person is living on itself might
disappear, and that this would allow
them to claim refugee status. However, it
still excludes the possibility that the land
might remain but that living there would
represent a risk to people’s health. This
means the definition does not cover most
of the threats prospective climate refugees are fleeing, already described in this
article. The only explicit categories of
what would successfully be recognized as
climate refugees by the UN are therefore
people whose land will imminently disappear and people subject to political or
social strife worsened by climate change.
This foreshadows the ways in which current UN policy will continue to fail to
address environmental refugees.
Examining the legal history of the
background case that the UN Human
Rights Committee ruled on in the 2020
document gives more clarity to the ways
in which people who migrate due to
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Jodie Gatfield, AusAID. Wikimedia commons (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)

Rising sea levels flood lowlands in Kiribati in 2009.

health risks associated with climate
change fail to be refugees within the
UN’s definitions. Mr. Teitiota and his
wife moved to New Zealand from
Tarawa, Kiribati, in 2007 to seek a better
living condition for their future family.
Teitiota and his family remained in New
Zealand after the expiration of their
visas in October 2010. To fight for their
chance to stay and avoid deportation,
Teitiota sought to apply for refugee
status.32 His request for asylum was
first denied by the Immigration
and Protection Tribunal (IPT) of New
Zealand, and the subsequent appeals
were also denied by the High Court, the
Court of Appeal and finally the Supreme
Court.33 Teitiota filed a communication
with the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), claiming his and
his family’s right to life had been violated
when New Zealand forced them to
return to Kiribati under the International
Covenant on Social and Political
Rights.34 In its 2020 ruling, the UN
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Human Rights Committee found that
New Zealand was within its rights to
force Teitiota and his family to return to
Kiribati.35 The Human Rights Committee
document suggested that some people
who flee climate change-related harm
may be eligible for refugee status, but the
boundaries for this eligibility highlight
that many prospective climate refugees
will, like Teitiota, fail to be granted protected status by the UNHCR.
The IPT examined the Teitiota claims
under the broader language of Article 6
of the UN International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,36 as well as the
UN Refugee Convention. Article 6 is
actually about genocide and capital punishment, but begins “Every human being
has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” However,
the IPT concluded in, the language of the
UN Human Rights Commission ruling,
that Teitiota failed to establish signs of
state failure because

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

[A]n arbitrary deprivation of life
involves an interference that is:
(a) not prescribed by law; (b) not
proportional to the ends sought;
and (c) not necessary in the particular circumstances … On this
basis, the Tribunal accepted that
the right to life involves a positive
obligation of the state to fulfil this
right by taking programmatic steps
to provide for the basic necessities
for life. However, the author could
not point to any act or omission by
the Government of Kiribati that
might indicate a risk that he would
be arbitrarily deprived of his life
within the scope of article 6 of the
Covenant. The Tribunal considered
that the Government of Kiribati
was active on the international
stage concerning the threats of climate change...37
Evidently, states only need to be “active”
or have taken steps on the international
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stage to be immune from the possibility
of protecting their citizens from climate
change.38 Unless Teitiota could prove that
the people in his region all considered it
to be inhabitable and had largely fled, the
government of Kiribati had not, in the
UN’s eyes, failed to protect its citizens
from climate change.
The first attempted claimants to the
status of climate change refugees in
Teitiota’s region were not considered victims of persecution such that they were
granted refugee status, in part because the
environment impacts everyone living in
that area indiscriminately. Furthermore,
the impacts of climate change do not conform to state boundaries. For Teitiota to
claim refugee status, he would also have
had to prove that moving within the country wasn’t an option. Teitiota’s plea for
asylum was taken as a matter of immigration in the sociological sense, rather than
a matter of being subject to harm directed
by a specific agent. A “sociological refugee” is not a refugee to whom the Refugee
Convention applies.39
Another way for Teitiota to appeal the
denial of his request for asylum would be
to prove that returning to Kiribati would
put him and his family in imminent danger. The UN Human Rights Committee
recognized that climate change can have
“sudden onset events and slow onset processes,”40 and that in terms of returning
Teitiota to Kiribai, under the UN’s
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,41 climate change in
receiving states “may expose individuals
to a violation of their rights under article
6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering
the non-refoulment obligations of sending States.”42 However, the UN Human
Rights Committee did not rule that
Teitiota’s concern about his home losing
land mass, which might amount to a crisis in 10–15 years, was sufficiently imminent threat or danger to trigger the
non-refoulment obligations, despite the
fact that this was well within Teitiota and
his family’s lifetimes. Moreover, this
timeline “could allow for intervening acts
by Kiribati, with assistance of the international community.”43 Since the risk of
harm posed by the environment itself
was unlikely to be imminent by this

14
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standard, Teitiota claimed that violence
is likely to erupt shortly due to overcrowding and land disputes. The court
rejected this claim based on “the absence
of a situation of general conflict in
Kiribati.”44 That is, the risks of harm and
danger caused by resources becoming
scare would only be recognized when
acts of violence have been generally
committed. As one dissenting committee
member criticized:
It would indeed be counter-intuitive to the protection of life to wait
for deaths to be very frequent and
considerable; in order to consider
the threshold of risk as met.45
In contrast, this description of the
kinds of things that refugees might flee
would squarely justify Teitiota and his
family’s petition to remain in New
Zealand under the Catholic Church’s
understanding of refugees: The forces
they are fleeing (water scarcity, sea-level
rise, and depletion of natural resources)
are explicitly listed as displacing forces in
the POCDP. If it were possible to use the
Catholic Church’s refugee framework, it
would extend protection to Teitiota, and
therefore, to other prospective refugees
whose cases he foreshadows.
Of the two attempts to comprehensively define human rights, the UN
Human Rights Committee therefore has
now articulated the potential for refugee
status being awarded to people fleeing
imminent sea-level rise and political
instability exacerbated by climate
change, while the Vatican Dicastery for
Promoting Integral Human Development
has successfully brought the human rights
tradition of Catholic Social Thought to
bear in defining refugees as people who
have been forced from their homes by
sea-level rise, political instability, lack of
access to “basic needs,” and harm to individual well-being by environmental dangers.46 Both organizations are responding
to a perceived future in which climate
change combined with socioecological
circumstances will displace enormous
numbers of people. However, the consequences of their different approaches
would be extremely different.

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

A Crucial Distinction:
Attention to Individual Health
The fundamental difference between
the Catholic Church’s recognition of
environmental refugees and the UN’s
definition seems to stem in part from the
description of the kinds of wrongs refugees might flee with which each organization begins. The Catholic Church
explicitly highlights a human right to
health as relevant to refugee status—
consistent for an organization with such
a determined focus on bioethics. This
allows it the intellectual resources to
explain the dangers to refugees fleeing
environmental health threats, whether
they are posed by toxins or by a lack of
the preconditions for health, such as
clean water. This is a broad right that
does not require an intentional actor to
violate it, and it can be violated gradually.
Therefore, the Catholic Church is able to
describe the reasons that many who
would consider themselves environmental refugees have been forced to flee. The
UN instead must find ways to describe
the threat of climate change under its
definition of the kinds of things refugees
flee, which must be persecution causing
intentional harms, or recently might
involve land imminently disappearing,
resulting in a narrow definition of climate refugees.
This article does not represent the first
time someone has suggested that individual health is important for understanding
the harm of climate change: indeed, environmental disasters have been identified
as public health crises for years.47 Nor is
it the first philosophical suggestion that
in principle, organizations should extend
existing legal protections to protection to
people fleeing violations of their health.48
However, connecting these lines of
thought to the UN’s lack of protection
afforded to people attempting to claim
status as climate refugees is important.
That an environment threatening human
health has no corresponding right to refugee status in UN documents has a great
price for people fleeing environmental
harms who wish to claim refugee status,
as the counterexample of the Catholic
POCDP makes clear.
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With this fundamental difference
between the approaches of the UN and the
Catholic Church identified, there is hope
to articulate the reasons the UN protections for migrants designated as refugees
should also apply to those who choose to
seek refugee status justified by climate
change. The UN is capable of taking the
health threats of climate change seriously.
Elsewhere, the UN already says:
[T]he human right to safe drinking
water and sanitation is … inextricably related to the right to …
physical and mental health, as well
as the right to life and human dignity49 … the right to water applies to
everyone, States parties should give
special attention to … women, children, minority groups, indigenous
peoples, refugees, asylum seekers,
internally displaced persons.50
The preceding constitutes the start of
a wedge for protection for those fleeing
places where climate change has contributed to making things like access to clean
water and at least minimally protective
sanitation impossible. As already
observed, the UN now indicates that climate change refugees might exist: “Given
that the risk of an entire country becoming submerged under water is such an
extreme risk, the conditions of life in
such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity.”51
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, in part created by the United
Nations Environment Programme, has
described numerous human health
threats caused by climate change.52 The
third UN Sustainable Development Goal
is “Ensure healthy lives and promote
well-being for all at all ages.”53

A Way Forward for the UN
Definition of Refugees
As Ioane Teitiota’s early test case of
prospective climate refugee policy has
shown, the specifics of international
policy relating to climate refugees will
have massive impacts on the lives of of
people displaced by sea level rise. In
2020, the United Nations supported
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New Zealand’s choice to force Teitiota
to move home because his situation did
not fall under their World War II-era
definition of what constitutes refugees.
Teitiota must not be allowed to be a
canary in a coal mine: the first of millions of people to whom, should they
apply for it, the United Nations will
refuse refugee designation.
The dissents to the UN Human Right
Committee’s ruling on Teitotia described
flaws in the opinion that demonstrate that
the UN has the capacity to surpass the current opinion’s limitations by focusing on
human health. According to the dissenting
opinion of Duncan Laki Muhumuza:
... the Committee needs to handle
critical and significantly irreversible issues of climate change with
an approach that seeks to uphold
the sanctity of human life. […] The
considerable difficulty in accessing
fresh water because of the environmental conditions, should be
enough to reach the threshold of
risk, without being a complete lack
of fresh water. […] It should be sufficient that the child of the author
[Teitiota] has already suffered significant health hazard on account
of the environmental conditions.
[…] New Zealand’s action is more
like forcing a drowning person
back into a sinking vessel, with the
“justification” that after all there
are other voyagers on board. Even
as Kiribati does what it takes to
address the conditions; for as long
as they remain dire, the life and
dignity of persons remains at risk.54
We suggest that attention to the human
right to an environment that is not detrimental to health, as expressed in the dissenting opinion just quoted and central
to the POCDP, exemplifies how the UN
might move to recognize the status of
those who seek to become climate refugees
within its existing refugee policy.
The Convention and protocol relating to
the status of refugees (1951) emerged from
a world awash in desperate people, after
years of devastating warfare. Its original
definition of refugees must be reexamined
in our world, again awash in desperate
WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

people, many threatened by a destabilized
environment due to how we approach what
might best be called an indifferent ideology
of industrialization. We live in a world
where national and regional tensions over
human migrants can quickly come to a boil,
where concerns about terrorism and migration quickly get connected, and where the
socioecological factors interacting in the
face of a destabilized climate include
the old intractable features of tribalism,
oppression, and hegemonic power. Some
nations will have deep internal divisions
about people claiming status as refugees at
their borders, while others will have fossil
fuel-based economies that cause them to
oppose the mitigation of climate change in
the name of their own economic and political stability. Those seeking to claim the
status and protections of climate change
refugees must be insulated from this geopolitical maelstrom when an inhospitable
environment impels their movement.
Centering the human rights of these people
in light of the POCDP can help. A focus on
protecting individual health gives us a tool
to bring clarity to the reasons behind the
differences between the two recent documents, which will impact the rights of millions of people who might claim the status
of climate change refugees in our rapidly
changing world. As the Preface of the
POCDP says:55
We are engulfed by news and
images of whole peoples uprooted
by cataclysmic changes in our climate, forced to migrate. But what
effect these stories have on us, and
how we respond—whether they
cause fleeting responses or trigger
something deeper in us; whether
it seems remote or whether we feel
it close to home—depends on our
taking the trouble to see the suffering that each story entails...
For both ethical and practical reasons,
the international community cannot
afford to ignore the fact that our planet
is being changed by our own actions, and
that climate change and our response and
attitude toward the consequences will
produce the greatest humanitarian challenge of the next century. One way to
ameliorate this crisis is to expand
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already-existing refugee protections to
those seeking such protection who are
fleeing the impacts of this crisis.
It is time for the UN to move beyond
1951 and the Convention and protocol
relating to the status of refugees. The UN
can follow the lead of the POCDP and
update its definition of refugees to
include a focus on protecting individual
health, and can therefore be able to support the human rights of people striving
to claim status in the coming decades as
climate change refugees. The time for
this is both now and already past.
ORCID
Steven A. Kolmes
http://orcid.
org/0000-0002-7782-5241
Steven A. Kolmes holds the Rev. John Molter, C.S.C., Chair
in Science in the Environmental Studies department at the
University of Portland, Oregon. Sara K. Kolmes has a PhD in
philosophy focused on bioethics from Georgetown
University, and is a clinical ethicist at Providence Health &
Services in Oregon. Pei-Hsuan (Franzi) Lin is a PhD candidate in the Government Department, Georgetown University,
where she researches borders and refugee rights.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

16.

17.

© 2022 The Authors. Published with license by Taylor &
Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits noncommercial
reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

NOTES
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

16

“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees,” https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10
https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/climate/
wmo-statement-state-of-global-climate
K. K. Rigaud, A. de Sherbinin, B. Jones, J. Bergmann, V.
Clement, K. Ober, J. Schewe, S. Adamo, B. McCusker, S.
Heuser, and A. Midgley, Groundswell : Preparing for
Internal Climate Migration (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2018). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/29461, License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
N. Dasandi et al., “Intergovernmental Engagement
on Health Impacts of Climate Change,” Bulletin of the
World Health Organization 99, no. 2 (2021): 102.
https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/11/581
f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-changedisaster-displacement.html
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climatecrisis-migration-and-refugees
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Changeon-Migration.pdf
D. L. Swain, D. Singh, D. Touma, and N. S. Diffenbaugh,
“Attributing Extreme Events to Climate Change: A New

ENVIRONMENT

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.
28.

Frontier in a Warming World,” One Earth 2 (2020):
522–527, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.05.011.
J. Hansen, M. Sato, P. Hearty, R. Ruedy, M. Kelley, V.
Masson-Delmotte, G. Russell, G. Tselioudis, J. Cao, E.
Rignot, I. Velicogna, B. Tormey, B. Donovan, E.
Kandiano, K. von Schuckmann, P. Kharecha, A. N.
Legrande, M. Bauer, and K.-W. Lo, “Ice Melt, Sea Level
Rise and Superstorms: Evidence From Paleoclimate
Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations
That 2ºC Global Warming Could Be Dangerous,”
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 16 (2016): 3761–
812, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-16-3761-2016.
S. A. Kulp and B. H. Strauss, “New Elevation Data
Triple Estimates of Global Vulnerability to SeaLevel Rise and Coastal Flooding,” Nature
Communications 10 (2019): 4844, https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41467-019-12808-z
C. Santos and J. Morais Mourato, “Voices of
Contention: The Value of Development Narratives
in the Age of Climate (Change) Migration
Misconceptions,” Climate and Development (2021),
doi:10.1080/17565529.2021.1877103.
Ibid.
M. Lahsen, G. de Azevedo Couto, and I. Lorenzoni,
“When Climate Change Is Not Blamed: The Politics
of Disaster Attribution in International Perspective,”
Climatic Change 158 (2020): 213–33.
M. Lahsen and J. Ribot, “Politics of Attributing
Extreme Events and Disasters to Climate
Change,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate
Change e750 (2021), https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.750
R. Parrish, T. Coulbourn, P. Lauriola, S. Hajat, and A.
Zeks, “A Critical Analysis of the Drivers of Human
Migration Patterns in the Presence of Climate
Change: A New Conceptual Model,” International
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
17 (2020): 6036, doi:10.3390/ijerph17176036.
I. Boas, C. Farbotko, H. Adams, H. Sterly, S. Bush, K.
van der Geest, H. Wiegel, H.,Ashraf, A. Baldwin, G.
Bettini, S. Blondin, M. de Bruijn, D. Durand-Delacre,
C. Fröhlich, G. Gioli, L. Guaita, E. Hut, F. X. Jarawura,
M. Lamers, S. Lietaer, S. L. Nash, E. Piguet, D. Rothe,
P. Sakdapolrak, L. Smith, B. Tripathy Furlong, E.
Turhan, J. Warner, C. Zickgraf, R. Black, and M.
Hulme, “Climate Migration Myths,” Nature Climate
Change 9 (2019): 901–3.
But for more recent thought from one of the authors:
I. Boas et al., note 17.
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/udhr.pdf
https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10
“Convention and Protocol,” note 1.
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-anddisasters.html
Rerum Novarum, http://www.vatican.va/content/
leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_
15051891_rerum-novarum.html
Quadragesimo Anno, http://www.vatican.va/content/
pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_
19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html
R. A. Butkus and S. A. Kolmes, “Ecology and the
Common Good: Sustainability and Catholic Social
Teaching,” Journal of Catholic Social Thought 4
(2007): 403–36.
R. A. Butkus and S. A. Kolmes, “Global Climate
Change and the Church in the Modern World: A
Sign of the Times. An Interdisciplinary Examination
of a Contemporary Issue in Light of Catholic Social
Teaching,” in Teaching, Faith and Service: Foundations of
Freedom, (Portland, OR: University of Portland Press,
2006), 2231–52, ISBN 978-0-9817771-0-4, https://pilotscholars.up.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=gar_conf; R. A. Butkus and S. A. Kolmes,
Environmental Science and Theology in Dialogue, 2011
(Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Press) 244 pages.
https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2021/03/30/210330b.html
M. Bowers, “Waiting for the Tide to Turn: Kiribati’s
Fight for Survival,” The Guardian (2017), https://

WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.
54.
55.

www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/23/waitingfor-the-tide-to-turn-kiribatis-fight-for-survival
“Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4)
of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication
No. 2728/2016,” 9.12, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/
climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/
sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200107_
CCPRC127D27282016-_opinion.pdf
Ibid., 2.8.
Ibid, 9.11.
“Views adopted by the Committee,” note 29, 2.1.
Ibid., 2.8, 2.10.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 7.2.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
“Views adopted by the Committee,” note 29, 2.9.
Ibid., 9.6.
Ibid., [54].
Ibid., 9.11
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
“Views adopted by the Committee,” note 29, 9.11.
Ibid., 9.12.
Ibid., 9.9.
Ibid., Annex 2.5.
A great deal of material about implementation of the
POCDP is at https://migrants-refugees.va
N. Watts et al., “The Lancet Countdown on Health
and Climate Change: From 25 Years of Inaction to a
Global Transformation for Public Health,”
Lancet 391, no. 10120 (2018): 581–630; S. Tong and
K. Ebi, “Preventing and Mitigating Health Risks of
Climate Change,” Environmental Research 174
(2019): 9–13; J. D. Ford, “Indigenous Health and
Climate Change,” American Journal of Public
Health 102, no. 7 (2012): 1260–66.
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005); M. C.
Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,”
Fordham Law Review 66 (1997): 273; J. Mann, “Health
and Human Rights,” American Journal of Public
Health 96, no. 11 (2006): 1940–43.
Human Rights Council, “Resolution Adopted by the
Human Rights Council 15/9 Human Rights and
Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation,” 2010,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/691661?ln=en#
record-files-collapse-header
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, “General Comment no. 15, The Right to
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),” 2002,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/486454?ln=en
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-changelitigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-uscase-documents/2020/20200107_CCPRC127D27
282016-_opinion.pdf
K. R. Smith, A. Woodward, D. Campbell-Lendrum,
D. D. Chadee, Y. Honda, Q. Liu, J. M. Olwoch, B.
Revich, and R. Sauerborn, “Human Health: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Co-Benefits,” in Climate Change
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A:
Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. C. B.
Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D.
Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O.
Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N.
Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, and L. L.
White (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 709–54.
https://sdgs.un.org/goals
“Views Adopted by the Committee,” note 29, Annex 2.5.
https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2021/03/30/210330b.html

VOLUME 64

NUMBER 3

